¡Que las fuerzas del cielo nos acompañen y viva la libertad carajo!
Right on! So, so here we have, as you can hear, from original sources directly and unfiltered, reporting on Javier Milei's election victory in Argentina and his shocking landslide, Aleksi Tolvanen. Hello.
Hi. Thanks for having me. I think this is the fourth time, and I have to give some credit before we jump to Amos Ahola, who has also spoken about this topic about a year ago, meaning the probabilities of Javier Milei's libertarian success, so I have to say, regarding these latest episodes—it hasn't been long—and you just confessed to me before this that you were a bit worried about what it was.
Well, actually, two months ago at the end of August, I predicted these percentages: 40% for La Libertad Avanza and around 30% for the Peronists. That's what I said, and my prediction was correct, unlike for example some professional propagandists in Finland. I predicted this correctly, so it's a good result. Yeah. But there was some small election in between that looked bad, didn't it?
Well yeah, we can probably talk more about that soon. I mean, the provincial elections in Buenos Aires—those are different elections. La Libertad Avanza was slightly over 30%, and the Peronists had very, very strong support, but now this situation for the parliamentary elections is turning out well. Yeah, let's talk about why exceeding exactly 40% was so important. And now Amos Ahola, indeed, you came here with a scalpel about a year ago,
and back then there were faint echoes that Finland might also make some cuts, and you said that Javier Milei had this chainsaw and he has really used it on those costs, so you brought the scalpels. If we start with this, though. How about a little fresh Finnish update? Yeah.
Well, that scalpel hasn't really been swinging much, so I don't know if even nail scissors have been used for cutting. These have been purely nominal. We don't have like hundreds of millions—something completely ridiculous. No, no, nothing in practice. But I have to say, regarding this Argentina situation, I'm positively surprised. A year ago, I suspected that if you go at it like that, it won't take long before the people go like, 'no thanks, this was a bad deal.' But in the elections, it actually
went the opposite way, which restores my faith in democracy a bit, which has crumbled quite significantly over the years. So apparently it is actually possible for the people to vote correctly.
Although, I don't know, we'll probably discuss that twenty-something billion currency swap and other things today, so that probably helped, but let's talk about that at some point. Yeah, that's right. And there's Aleksi now, that HS has been too modest to say the names of the culprits, but I can say it. So, basically, here Helsingin Sanomat and YLE, like, lost the elections once again, and Neuvottelijastudio won the elections— exactly. That's how it is. And let's have a drink for that, Melas.
Yeah, definitely, it's nice to be right.
Yeah, to freedom. Aijai. So, here, like, um, let's put up this image, if it hasn't been put up yet, so there we're pouring some, uh, Yellow Widow [Veuve Clicquot], which has been opened in the French cavalry officer style by sabering. Here we have some happy people in the studio. Yeah, but well, when you read these election comments from places other than just Finland, there was
this kind of pent-up joy that now that there were the midterms and the preceding regional elections, since there was a bit of a bad trend, that now we'll get rid of Javier Milei and get these 'good guys', meaning the Peronists, into power—I mean, who could consider Peronists as 'good guys' other than a completely rotten leftist journalist. Yeah, so this—maybe in Finland it would actually be nice if YLE or Hesari or anyone would actually recap Argentina's history over the last hundred years,
so it would be a good, comprehensive overview. So it was only in the 40s that the Peronists came to power under Juan Perón in Argentina. They are, after all, national socialists, leftists, and they've done all sorts of things over the last 70 years, increasingly leaning into leftist politics. There was also someone like Kirchner in between, who practiced their own brand of leftist politics, but I think there's
a lesson for Finland in what happens when you have leftists in power for long enough. In Finland, we've seen this only for the last twenty years or so—no growth, taking on debt, and sort of waiting for a better tomorrow. In Argentina, it took almost a hundred years before they finally realized that enough is enough, and now they have a market-liberal president. So, on this trajectory, that's 80 years away for Finland, and none of us will be
around to see it. That would be a real tragedy—okay, in all reality, I believe it's 30 years away for Finland, but if we have 30 years of zero growth ahead and we could avoid it now with market-liberal reforms, then shouldn't we, dear people of Finland, consider them? Instead of voting for these homegrown Peronists of ours, who are indeed in every single parliamentary party.
Well said. And really, in my opinion, this is just so brilliant the case and I mean, they don't want to break it down here in the Finnish press like I mean, how quickly, how quickly this whole thing has been turned around so from a nearly hopeless situation and then, like, still hoping that it can when returning to the job, like, how, who can be so, like, cold and cruel. But Aleksi, let's bring you back in, you've now looked into these well, you predicted this result correctly. The Peronists stayed there, well, no
to a third, and in a way this LLA party, as it's abbreviated, well but yeah, first of all, the September provincial elections in Buenos Aires province, even though compared to the provincial elections two years ago Libertad Avanza increased its support slightly and got over 30%, so it isn't enough, because now the anti-Peronist force in Argentina has
become led by libertarians and LLA, so that's why Libertad Avanza has to compensate in its support for those like, center-right parties that have been there, meaning Juntos por el Cambio, PRO, and now, like, three scenarios if we look at the elections, then 30% for LLA in the parliamentary elections would have been a weak
result, that the parliamentary balance would likely have weakened. Okay, regarding these scenarios, it depends a bit on how the votes are distributed in the country, but 35% would have been quite neutral, and 40%, which I predicted last time for Libertad Avanza, is a strong result and now it's reflected in the parliamentary composition. Regarding this composition,
why that 40% for Libertad Avanza is a strong result, I have three points.
First, the veto power with this parliamentary I mean, the composition of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies the Peronist opposition cannot override the president's veto, because that would require in both chambers of parliament a two-thirds majority. So now, overriding the president's veto
by these Peronists and other opposition won't work.
Maybe a technical clarification there: does it mean that if they wanted to bring in their own law, if they'd had two-thirds, they could have pushed it through and, in a way, Milei couldn't have blocked it with that third, it would have passed, and now it's not even worth them submitting their own laws, because they won't get through that final lock.
Yeah. Well, what caused negative market reactions in Argentina's financial markets in recent months was that the Peronists had these kinds of, like, spending increase projects in parliament that could have watered down Argentina's budget surplus, but now, especially after this election result, in the Chamber of Deputies, LLA—Milei's party—already has about
a third of the seats, and then LLA plus the center-right PRO party is 40%.
With these kind of parliamentary compositions, the opposition cannot override the president's veto power and then dilute the budget surplus with these spending increase projects, and and furthermore, the Senate composition is also quite quite strong. Meaning LLA plus PRO combined, they have over a third of the seats, but then because of the election multiplier, La Libertad
Avanza is slightly weaker. Okay. This was the first point, this president's veto power. Then the second point is that, uh, this Peronist opposition could have divided, could have started to push for this kind of, in Argentina it's called a 'juicio político' process. So this is a kind of, well, political process, but
in a way also a legal process, uh, to remove someone in a high political position or someone in a high office, a person, meaning for example the president, to be removed from office. So if the Peronists had gotten strong support in parliament, then in the worst case it would have, through this 'juicio político' process, led to Milei's presidential term ending
prematurely. And here too, you need both houses of parliament, if this 'juicio político' were to lead to the president's dismissal, then you need that, like, two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and now that won't succeed. Hey, a question Aleksi, you clearly know this Argentine politics considerably better than I do, and
I assume better than... so is this practically the situation now where, as Matti and Teppo said, the pace is accelerating. So now Milei got more power and can implement these reforms now, like, more, faster, better. Yeah, that was actually well phrased.
I was coming to my third point, which is the pace is accelerating indeed, because now the parliamentary positions strengthened and this also means that now in both houses of parliament, those middle-ground parties that aren't clearly LLA's allies, but aren't clearly Peronists or socialists either,
so this election result was now a strong mandate for Milei's poverty-reducing and economic growth- increasing policies, so now these middle-ground parliamentary groupings then have like, a greater incentive and greater enthusiasm after this strong mandate
to cooperate with La Libertad Avanza. And with this, it's for example more likely that Milei can, uh, promote then labor market reforms, tax reforms in Argentina.
Yeah, in this studio we're probably rocking the Portion Boys version of this classic, since we're that modern after all. Uh, but good, good point, meaning the pace is picking up and more, faster, better, but well, uh, this is quite an interesting American link, so couldn't you say that here you have like an upper house and a lower house and a president, so it's like a mini version of the States, and here the left-wing, uh, press immediately spins it from the same angle here, that right-wing
populist and authoritarian forces are getting to steamroll, so do you see that there are like similarities with the US system? Well, before we go into that, I want to bring up. That's like an important flag to state, I mean how the political systems of Argentina and the US are... like, different or rather different from Finland in that the results of presidential elections can actually impact national policy. In Finland,
that's not the case. In the presidential election constitutional reform of the 2000s, all powers were taken from the president because people feared the next Kekkonen, with the result being that we now just have a figurehead, basically. Well, it's a bit miserable when we have a figurehead, I mean, like the president, and Stubb has now exceptionally perhaps done a bit beyond that, sold a couple of icebreakers and so on, but at the same time, we have a multi-party system
in parliament that can never make any reforms because it doesn't really matter who you vote for, you'll have the RKP and others like them putting on the brakes. So, the systems in Argentina and the US are a much more dynamic democracy than what we have in Finland. For better or worse, because like that Trump thing has gone overboard, whereas in Milei's case, it was ultimately enough to first vote for one man who then started rolling out these
reforms. But anyway, I just wanted to say that in this regard, I do support a bit more of a bold approach than what we have in Finland.
Still, in your liberal heart, there's this big, big gap for strongmen or authoritarians. Hey, let's put it this way, it would be for strong women too, but I mean, like, who is familiar with the movie Evita and Madonna's song, so, like 'Don't Cry for Me Argentina' and all that, well, it's a carbon copy of Sanna Marin, one-to-one, so it's worth taking a look
at that, though she has so many shoes. Well, not yet, but I mean okay, so Argentina had Peronism, and it was largely Eva Peron's contribution, I mean, okay, she died young, but the impact she had was so huge that I don't think it's at all impossible that 'Marinism' will emerge in Finland. I mean, sincerely, we we already saw this like Li Andersson got into Europe as an MEP just through like girl
power votes and I mean okay I am a feminist man and there is nothing wrong with that but it doesn't have to be that leftist like on the other hand Marin Marin is doing six pull-ups and earned like 2 million in the last financial statements of Mapi Oy so anyway she's certainly grown into a capitalist just like Nalle so like hopefully if she returns to national politics in Finland hopefully she'll return as a right-winger then but well Aleksi could comment a bit on this Argentine
presidential-driven system but maybe as an intermediate point then again like in France where it's a bit of the same thing then if it goes completely south then the pieces just fall to the floor and nothing rises because now there's Macron kind of in power but then there's nothing left to save in that parliament and they'd still have to like somehow endure the rest of this term so it could go completely south and yeah yeah I mean this is interesting and this is like maybe the in my opinion the discussion at an abstract level that should be had in Finland about what the
function of this democratic system is and how it should roll because ours clearly doesn't work I mean we can look in the mirror after 20 years and conclude that our thing isn't rocking it was already like Katainen's government halfway through that term they stated that we don't actually do anything we sit on our hands and wait so the nation can't afford this but well I don't know Aleksi do you have any comm Aleksi do you have any comments on this Argentine
democratic system? Is it good or bad?
Well maybe I'd take this current perspective anyway on this that here we now have such a strong alternative in La Liberta Avanza and then the other side is the Peronist it's so foolishly socialist that there's such a radical difference and then these like so-called center-right ones Mauricio Macri's administration which was there before President Alberto Fernández well this didn't however
succeed in reforming the country Okay these center-right guys Macri Luis Luis Caputo you can cooperate with them but the administration must nevertheless be libertarian-led so that things actually get done that's what Argentina's recent history now shows but then if we look at these like market reactions to the elections that
the risk of Peronism meaning Argentine socialism is so great that the market reactions have been bleak that now when there were these September provincial elections and La Libertad Avanza's result was like too weak then immediately on the Mon after election Sunday
on Monday the Merval index fell over 10% almost 15%. Now after the October parliamentary elections, the Merval index has been rising all week meaning on the Monday after election Sunday the Merval index rose over 20% a truly incredible daily rise. Now for a week the Merval index has been rising reaching all-time high levels again and now
now that there started to be that kind of anticipation and pessimism, especially in August and September, that now the Libertarians would do poorly, so the market had come down. Likewise, the debt prices and interest rates reacted.
So after the provincial elections in September, the price of Argentine government debt fell significantly and rates rose and then after the October parliamentary elections, interest rates fell and prices rose. Now we have seen this as a kind of test laboratory, that this
market reaction has been so large and so clear after these elections, that the fear of Peronism. In Argentina they use a term like 'riesgo K' and 'K' refers to this kind of, like, a different kind of
Peronist, like a core, hard-line Peronist Riesgo K is then the risk of Peronism or the risk of Argentine socialism, you could translate it here as sweater risk, to keep things clear and beautiful yeah, sweater risk, so in Finland it's like 'beware of the miracle' sweater economists among us and they are not ashamed of it, they speak
with those mystical words and mumble about, you know, social justice and about overall tax rates being too low so, say no to them. Oh damn, that cut off, I had a point but that was so good that it completely cut my train of thought yeah but that market reaction itself is true, the economy is like this discounting thing, so the fall in market rates and government debt risk
and the rise in stocks are like good signals. In Finland too, by the way, there's been strong performance this year in interest rates and stock prices. I don't know how much is thanks to the current government, but it might have something to do with it, that now it came back to me. See, the leftists don't consider these stock prices or government debt interest as any kind of indicators, they are just nonsense, even though in reality they tell us about people's trust—maybe even George Soros's way of making money
yeah, like some kind of robber's nonsense, even though they actually reflect trust above all, and anyone who is a bit to the right or understands anything knows that, but for lefties it's just like nonsense but like for the left-wingers I'd have a question, that if you've looked at the poverty, well, that poverty meter in Argentina, which has now with Milei dropped to the lowest level in like a decade, so isn't this even as a metric good enough for you, that
the country is doing well? So, okay, and like as an inflation metric that's also very low, which is like generally perceived to be a good thing when inflation is low, even if it is a bit of a capitalist metric, so would that poverty now be at least a metric where you could on X stop that crying now about Milei being in power, because like provably that guy is now making it happen that people like especially the poor, there are fewer of them. Or like is it a good thing that poor people
are fewer? I think it is, but I'm not quite sure about the leftists. So this like crying on X about Milei's successes, well it is in my opinion not very humane, like that poverty decreased. Oh no. Like like poverty decreased the wrong way. Yeah, I, uh, you have empty glasses. I'll drink these first while we have a little toast.
Yeah, but uh this is about the reduction of poverty.
Yeah, yeah. I mean, we all want, even though no matter how much we are exploitative right-wingers, we sincerely want that there is less poverty in the world. Yeah, like, I'm not lying now.
Yeah, have to toast with empty glasses, gotta come over here and fill up the glasses, but uh that's a good point, the indicators are going in the right direction. Even the GDP, the national debt's uh, dollar-denominated level is stabilizing the central bank's like totally wrecked balance sheet has been brought under control and then those public consumption expenditures. Honestly, it's wonderful to watch when the chainsaw goes
vroom and then there's like less left there crap, and then I'll also mention that this kind of corrupt corporate subsidies, so like the kind shoveled by politicians to their buddies, like money has decreased. All of this that in Finland is like alive and well, like NGO subsidies, corporate subsidies, the whole thing revolves around who is being dealt public money now, they are doing well and then it gets wasted. I read that there's indeed, with this
archaic like Peronist system, it has gone to the level that with it individual legislative projects could be made to specifically fund some buddy's projects, and now that they can be snipped away, like no more, then well in Finland there's like a shocking amount of these third sector offshoots still. I think it was Mauri Pekkarinen, who once into some law shoved like shrimp, some damn shrimp farm subsidy, because that drinking buddy or some other buddy was, you know, who had one shrimp farming. Yeah, that has happened in Finland too.
And it might be that this YLE taxpayer thing of ours, it might not be a joke, that you can find this camel breeding in the table as an oasis. There would be, yeah, Mauri's friend. Since in Finland it is found on the list of legal businesses and as such still competitive, wouldn't surprise me if Mauri Pekkarinen's Camels Ltd is there somewhere, but anyway, yeah, I'm just filling, filling
our glasses here, so Aleksi, regarding poverty, isn't it true that there are official statistical observations about this yeah, yes, the standard way this poverty debate is conducted is using INDEC, Argentina's statistics agency's data and now the latest INDEC poverty report, I mean the INDEC and Poverty report came out back in September, and according to
the forecasts, now again, both in poverty and indigence extreme poverty has decreased, in poverty it's now around 30 percent, and this concerns the latest official INDEC report, for the first half of this year, and now there are again these poverty forecasts from Martin Rozada and co
for the second half of this year, meaning what we're in now and there too, the forecasts show that poverty is still decreasing. Mm-hmm. Yeah. And then I have to bring up that too, because in this sweater economist corner, the only thing usually muttered here is, yeah, but that mean, evil, big Satan, Trump, gamed this with some corrupt money trick, but there's
a bit of truth there. It's true that for example, in the financial crisis and the COVID crisis, various central banks around the world did these currency exchange lines, or swaps. So it's not exactly uncommon for these central bank cabals to help each other in need, and it's not impossible that both America and Argentina are kind of in the same neighborhood, so this can be done.
Sure, maybe there was a bit of exaggeration given to a 'good guy', but is it such a big sin? For example, mentioned here, Alex Stubb, I laughed at a tweet saying that he has made the most money playing golf. Yeah, indeed.
Like Tiger, so it's kind of the spirit of the game, if that guy is doing a transactional thing, why wouldn't you I mean, is it okay? Maybe it's not exactly liberal thinking, that you take money away using flattery, but is that really so wrong?
I think the essential point here is that this wasn't a bad deal for the US at all. I mean, basically it...
it was it was even like an investment or like a bet, which apparently like strengthening the exchange rate, it didn't like cost them 20 billion but it actually made a profit. So and this is like one point and so okay let's be clear, I mean it was election interference, no way around it and it's basically not kosher uh and I don't we don't accept it, but well the guys are playing with slightly bigger stakes than we are but there's that other aspect that if like
this hadn't been done, the Peronists would've won, things would've gone to shit again, then it would've been some IMF giving the same amount of money to something so these groups stay alive, so like it wouldn't necessarily have been any cheaper or like any better in the aftermath, the money would've been conjured from somewhere and put on the table eventually. And of course it's hoped that it won't leave any debt so to speak or that kind of personal debt
to Trump, whatever that might be, but well better this way than things going to shit, so it would have been emergency aid afterwards in that 'Art of the Deal' spirit, so if for example investment decisions like these came out of it and immediately US industry started to like, kind of be like we're going to start actually investing here now, so would they have come for those Peronists, probably not.
Well probably not. It's the classic. Yeah, invest in a country where socialists are in power. Well, we did that to Russia, by the way.
How did that go again? There it went.
Yeah. Well I do consider these at least a simplification of Argentina's complex economic and political situation.
it wouldn't have been just about helping Trump.
And the situation now in Argentina's economy and politics is significantly more complex. So, when I just described this 'sweater risk', well the current libertarian-led administration and that silly-socialist Peronism, it's so radically different. And here you also have to understand
Argentina's economic history, that if you think about Argentina's public debt, in fact, the Finnish state has more debt relative to GDP than Argentina has public debt. For Argentina it's, depending on how you calculate, about 70-80% relative to GDP. Finland has
more debt relative to GDP. Here the, probably sweater economists are proud of this, but but but, it actually it's like the amount of debt in Argentina isn't so impossibly large. But what's challenging about it now is that they have that recent economic history. Otherwise, the economic history is such that there
have been constant defaults on debt repayments, various defaults made, having to postpone debt payments. That's why the Argentine state doesn't have, uh, access to international debt bond markets at reasonable interest levels. And that's why
like even countries like Finland and Spain, Finland and Spain-like countries, they haven't lost their credibility on international debt markets.
so even though they have deficit budgets, they are able all the time like their maturing loan installments to refinance by taking at relatively reasonable interest levels debt from international private markets. Argentina cannot do this debt refinancing at reasonable interest levels. And now what has also been done in Argentina in recent history,
in recent economic history, is that there, like, well first of all those defaults, there were some during Alberto Fernández's previous Peronist president's administration, there were some during Mauricio Macri's time, so during Alberto Fernández and the preceding center- right administration, and there were during both Kirchners' administrations these defaults, debt restructurings, so Argentina doesn't have, like, credible access to these
international private debt markets. Argentina cannot refinance it. But in addition to that, what has traditionally been done, is leaving the next administration a very, like, maturity-profile-wise very difficult, uh, debt bomb. And now it has, from the previous Alberto Fernández's Peronist administration, been left in Milei's lap, that like maturity-profile-wise difficult debt bomb, that there are certain
debt installments, which are maturing. Is this like regards from Saramo, so to speak? Yeah, it's that short, short end is like tricky, it's often, like, the yield curve, like well it's kind of sloping, so well, you can get that low short-term loan at a slightly lower interest rate, well for interest technical reasons, but then if there's a huge pile of it, then its rolling over is really painful because it's constantly rolling over for re- financing yeah, and Argentina doesn't, like, well
the state has no credibility on these markets to be able to, like a normal or fairly reasonable like or fairly normal state's way, re- finance that debt. And and that's why managing liquidity is very challenging, so that's why, like the reason why they have to take liquidity financing from the US. Well that liquidity financing is not used to fund a deficit budget,
because now Milei's administration's budget is in surplus, but rather it is liquidity financing, and it can also be considered a diplomatic success that he gets along well with Trump and the Trump administration and other things. Yeah, these defaults are bitches. I mean, even Greece had those defaults and selective defaults, and now it's rocking a bit better again. But indeed, at that moment when someone tells you that 2 billion is due, where do you get it from, it's a bit of an
impossible situation, and Finland has done it many times, like Iiro Viinanen has also had to sweat— a fine man. A fine man— sweating somewhere like Japan, wondering if two billion will come from there, can he keep a straight face? Keep a straight face? I can't... but Aleksi, I have to ask, do you do these things for work or like on a hobby basis?
Well, regarding Argentina specifically, it's nice to be here on this podcast to appear, and I mean, I have a second Master's degree from Spain, through which I have a common circle of friends with Javier Milei, so that's where this enthusiasm comes from. Okay. But like, do you get paid for this or like, no? This is a sincere question, because I'm just thinking, that I would never step into the ring with you on these things. This guy is
on top of it. And at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, there could rather be this guy than Timo R. Stewart, for example.
Well, he's already been shown the door there. Yeah. Or his fixed-term contract is ending, but you're clearly on top of things, so where does this come from?
Well, it's because I have an economics and business education and indeed a second degree from Spain and such, and I've been a libertarian for a long time, so that, and now I'm fluent in Spanish of course, so that and following Argentina's economy, well, it's an enjoyable activity. What better thing to do in your free time than to read these Spanish-language statistics on Argentina's economy. But regarding that point from just now, when you look at
Argentina's public debt to GDP, it is not impossibly large, but the problem is that Argentina cannot from the private markets refinance that debt, but rather that there's that difficult default history. Argentina has no credibility in those markets, so that's why
in a way, the fact that if there were clearly a more quantitatively and numerically over-indebted country, whose debt-to-GDP ratio was higher than Argentina's, then maybe it would be more sensible, and if there wasn't such a previous default history, then maybe it would be more sensible to consider some kind of like debt restructuring. Default, but here like
Milei's debt management strategy has specifically been to stop the constant cycle of defaults and try to sort of normalize Argentina's sovereign financing position on international markets. It's not easy, but the administration is doing it as responsibly as possible.
Yeah, I mean, getting a 5% or 4% of GDP public deficit to zero in a year—I'd like to see that in Finland too.
Well, has anyone else done that in world history? I'm not entirely sure.
Yeah, while at the same time having to balance inflation, poverty, and other things. But that's interesting—I just saw on Twitter that there's a term for this. Apparently, it's 'the Bukele method.' It's where you just do things and don't listen to complaints about why they're impossible. Yeah. And then that sort of Peronist prank, like leaving behind broken debt maturities, no market access, a broken central bank, hyperinflation,
negative economic growth, poverty, a massive public deficit—it's quite a little trick to pull on the next team, but amazingly, you just take the helm, you know, and steer, and then somehow it just got sorted out—it's incredible in that sense, incredibly great that the people understood what's best for them. Giving him that 40 percent, so some leftist populist sweater-wearing economist would have easily riled up the people into thinking we'll
return to the old ways. Yeah, and they're good at that. They're good at it, and they'll certainly try, but I think after 100 years of biting their nails, it starts to reach a point where maybe the third generation of that leftist betrayal is ongoing, at some point they say to their kids, 'My grandmother and mother believed in this, and I believed in it too, but you shouldn't anymore.' So an evolutionary moment arrives when those
lies don't work—and they are sincerely lies. Like that leftist promise that redistribution creates good—it's sincerely bullshit, but it's very seductive bullshit, and that's why it gets support around the world. But apparently it reached the end of the road, at least in Argentina. Here, of course not, not even close. Yeah, we have a bit of that here too.
You mentioned Jussi Saramo, he famously said that it's a good thing that government debt interest rates will remain zero or negative, and apparently the Treasury took this seriously when they made such a like the brain fart of the century, that we change from like zero or negative fixed rates to floaters. Like how much like, and I mean it could be extreme stupidity or maybe a little political steering too, but whatever it was, it turned into
a small matter of a few billion, nothing much else. Yeah. Not enough, a few might turn into ten. It was, well, Matti Vanhanen admitted they had made that strategy for them years and years ago. So Matti Vanhanen had, if I recall, admitted this somewhere, that they were told, that according to all sorts of financial theories it's more sensible to keep it as floaters than fixed. And then he had written in some
strategy x years ago, that 'now go into floaters' and then they just saluted, like okay, this is what we're doing, without any of those fools there having the vision that we're actually playing poker here, like 'do I fold these aces in this situation?' So this is maybe like, I don't know, just some idiots or not having a penny at stake, so greetings to you, that when
you go home to sleep, how many billions did you blow with that decision there at the Finance Ministry, because the strategy said so—but you get to challenge that politicians' idiocy. My god. And Switzerland did the opposite.
They turned everything into, well, 100-year ones...
well, Austria did. Yeah. But anyway, yeah, but that thing...
it's true here that the yield curve is usually upward-sloping and then in bad times it might reverse. So it's usually a bad vulture-like moment when the short end reverses. But it's quite rare and statistically a smaller phenomenon, so it is quite true that corporate treasuries often pull it even to overnight— that's what it's called when Euribor is zero, so over-over-overnight the rate changes, not even a one-month
or three-month or 12-month Euribor like our average homeowners are given by the banking sector. But indeed, that when it goes negative, it's not a very common phenomenon in like financial history, that negative interest rates haven't occurred very often, so that too could have been modeled, that these two things could be true at the same time. Yield curve is often upward sloping, but the fact that it goes negative is not a common phenomenon,
so you shouldn't bet on it. Yeah. Imagine what kind of statue you'd have gotten in Finland like, 'yeah, I locked this whole national debt for like a hundred years at that rate.' I mean, if it had been cast in bronze, it would have been quite big— the Statue of Liberty wouldn't suffice, but now the debt-brake debaters get an extra 3-4 billion there now.
then this for fighting Patriina ah there's a fine man indeed I mean I'm waiting for the day he's a future chief economist no didn't he start yet I think that well of course with these trade unions can have quite short notice periods friend cen yeah and four-day work weeks too that among friends it can be a sort of matter of announcement, that I've switched camps now.
Yeah. But you use the term these sweater economists, so for me these are like the clergy it's a clergy with different colored robes, so there's like the red-robed clergy like Laina and then there's some blue- robed clergy, who are like Kangasharju. So it really wasn't about science anymore. Okay. I mean Laina isn't an economist really even by degree, but that doesn't matter, that you can still be a chief economist. Mm. so like
so I don't like that degree narcissism, that there are possible cases like although nowadays you see for example there are like for example Masters of Arts who are the world's best web coders so this is just an example that competence and degree don't always correlate but let's praise Milei now he is like we talked about so he is a doctor of economics and Austrian and all this isn't he
well yeah he actually has two Master's degrees in Argentina.
Not a doctor. Are you sure? I'll bet it's a doctorate in economics.
Any tax-bets from anyone? I can prove this, and cheers to these intermediate cheers to this but anyway a hardcore figure of the libertarian movement and in a way isn't it like the for Spain Spain is probably a bit frustrating to watch now that there's a bit of this lockdown-like phenomenon there, that they have the Catalans running the left-wing block at the moment.
So in a way it's probably quite distressing to be a libertarian there right now. But doesn't this brothers-in-arms axis because of language between Argentina and Europe go specifically through Spain?
Yeah I mean between Spain and Argentina the language connection definitely Spanish but this libertarian scene or liberal scene is also like quite a lot Well yeah the Spanish language there connects quite strongly of course. Yeah yeah. Are they boiling with rage there like now that in a way Argentina has this messiah, so in Spain they have to watch this sort of more traditional stuff. Well yeah, of course the discussion overall back and forth, it is it is more common more common
in Spain, but there are these that I know and then must keep making noise about it in Spain, explaining how this Milei's administration is good. It's leaning strongly in that direction. And now I'm trying to do my part here in Finland, kind of like what the Spanish people I know are doing there in Spain.
Very nice already. But now that Milei has, like, was it the Portion Boys version of that Mati Depo hype song fueling his momentum with that chainsaw and all, so what can we expect regarding American tech investments and kind of market economy, and regarding the 'Sami's investment tips' segment, I haven't actually invested there myself, except maybe
indirectly through a world index, but the markets have been soaring there, but what can we expect now for the rest of Milei's first presidential term? What can we expect in the best-case scenario?
Well, of course, the reforms will continue with even greater intensity, so hopefully tax reforms and labor market reforms will move forward, and the budget is in surplus, and we'll possibly get more cuts and such. And then probably the currency side, since he's not exactly a fan of the peso, but he has taken the traditional stabilization of the central bank through
lowering inflation as the primary steps, so probably a floating exchange rate is quite close.
Yes, exactly. It's important that during the peso's weakening trend, especially in recent months, the RSK— the risk of Peronism, the 'sweater risk'—it has also played a part in that. Yeah.
But now that the election result was so good, it kind of boosts the market position of the peso again.
Yeah. I suggest we head over to the Insiders side with Amos Ahola and Aleksi Tolvanen, and maybe this—since I don't know if you're in that scene, but this currency thing in liberalism interests me. Often they go towards Bitcoin or the crypto angle, and I'm not quite sure. I am a liberal myself who likes floating market-priced fiat currencies. So maybe I have some kind of broken soul left
in me that I still have to live with, but I suggest that we briefly discuss in the Insiders group whether the liberal or libertarian ideology, does it require some kind of hard money, gold, or Bitcoin or something else. I suggest we go talk about that on the Insiders side. Thank you, gentlemen. And shall we go over how the words went for this, for this...
¡Que las fuerzas del cielo nos acompañen y viva la libertad carajo!
Alright then. Yes, yes.